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ABSTRACT 
 
The Critique of Pure Reason inaugurated Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Commentators commonly 
distinguish between Kant’s Positive Project (PP), that is, his epistemology as laid out in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic, from his Negative Project (NP), 
expressed in terms of the destructive implications his epistemology has on speculative 
metaphysics and rational theology. Against this tradition I will argue that the whole of the 
Critique is largely a negative-destructive enterprise. I will focus on what is commonly taken as 
the centerpiece of the PP, that is, the Transcendental Deduction, and demonstrate that even here 
the NP is given normative priority. Though, to be sure, certain passages tend to encourage an 
interpretation of the PP as primary, I contend that this view is myopic and fails to pay sufficient 
attention to Kant’s global concerns in the Critique. I will demonstrate that a clear exposition of 
Kant’s metaphilosophical aims, commitments, and convictions is in fact corrosive to any such 
reading. The objective of this thesis, then, is two-fold: 1) to provide an account of Kant’s 
metaphilosophy in the Critique, and 2) to argue for what I will here and elsewhere refer to as the 
Primacy of the Negative Thesis, that is, that Kant prioritized boundary-setting over principle-
generating. 
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§1. Introduction 
 §1.1. Setting the Stage 
In this thesis I will be conducting a metaphilosophical investigation of Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason. Identifying the metaphilosophical underpinnings of the Critique should yield 
various insights into areas which remain obscure to many readers, specialists and non-specialists 
alike. More specifically, we should be able to provide some account of Kant’s motivations for 
writing the Critique and understand his objectives, both stated and implied, for theoretical 
philosophy in general. Our investment should be counted remunerative to the extent that a 
sufficiently developed metaphilosophical position acts a hermeneutical lens serving to further 
clarify the Critique itself. In several key passages in the Critique and Prolegomena, as well as his 
published correspondence, Kant offers descriptive and prescriptive accounts of theoretical 
philosophy. Kant is commonly credited with conceiving the delineation between rationalists and 
empiricists in modern philosophy, and describing both the historical context and contemporary 
circumstances of theoretical philosophy as they were in the closing decades of the 18th century. 
His normative or prescriptive program, however, charts a new trajectory for where future 
philosophy should go and what all is needed to get there. 
Broadly, Kant construes the tumultuous affairs of theoretical philosophy as a many-sided 
conflict which he designated the “general problem of pure reason.”1 In summarizing these 
events, Kant fleshes out several metaphilosophical positions, the subscribers of which are 
entrenched in a perennial dispute over the normative role and proper scope of reason. These 
metaphilosophical positions are offered as phases – progressing from dogmatism to skepticism, 
devolving to indifferentism, and finally terminating in transcendental or critical philosophy – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1
 Critique of Pure Reason (Henceforth, CPR). B 19 
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through which the history of reason is mapped onto modern philosophy. Each of these positions 
is a normative complex, comprised of various methods and aims, competing conceptions of 
reason, and theoretical desiderata for philosophical arguments,2 the sum of which allows 
subscribers to conduct research programs in speculative metaphysics in particular and theoretical 
philosophy in general. What is important, for the purposes of contrasting these views with Kant’s 
own, is that each of these positions, Kant’s included, unifies a set of principles and doctrines 
through which we understand our relationship to reason. I will argue that Kant offers the most 
considered and philosophically robust account of reason in its theoretical employment, both 
anchored within and circumscribed to our cognitive experience. I will argue for a 
metaphilosophical orientation of reason positioned as the ultimate authority we invoke when and 
wherever we make the normative claim that anyone, in identical circumstances, should judge as 
we do. 
§1.2. Metaphilosophy of the Critique of Pure Reason: Organization & Paper 
Structure 
Having introduced the subject and principal aims of my thesis in §1, I will give a cursory 
treatment of the Crisis in Metaphysics in §2, using Kant’s analogy of the crisis as a conflict of 
legitimacy in a political saga. In §3 I will carve out the contours of Kant’s metaphilosophy, 
centered on his evolving notion of Critique. Next, I will use the Amphiboly in §4 to advance and 
clarify several of Kant’s criticisms of Locke and Leibniz. In §5 I will provide exposition of key 
arguments in the Critique leading up the Transcendental Deduction (TD). I will conclude in §6 
by performing textual exegesis of Kant’s claims in the TD, determining their metaphilosophical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This list is hardly meant to be exhaustive, but indicates certain core doctrines and presuppositions native to each 
metaphilosophical position. 
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significance, and extrapolating from them various commitments Kant’s arguments presuppose 
and entail. 
§2. The Crisis in Metaphysics: A Prelude to the Metaphilosophy 
§2.1. Queen Metaphysics mourns like Hecuba: Greatest of all by Race and Birth, I now 
am Cast Out, Powerless3 
“Part of the complexity of the Critique of Pure Reason,” Allen Wood observes, “is due to 
Kant’s intention to argue on several fronts against several different alternative positions current 
in modern philosophy generally, and within the German Enlightenment in particular.”4 Of the 
various objectives, the “most fundamental…is to rein in the pretensions of traditional 
metaphysics.”5 In the A Preface, Kant illustrates the contentious history of metaphysics by 
casting both the Critical philosophy, as well as the various contenders to philosophical 
supremacy, as members in a political saga. Metaphysics is accorded her traditional honor as 
“Queen of the Sciences” but, being accused by some as a pretender to the throne, is having her 
claim subjected to the scrutiny of reason.6  
 “In the beginning,” Kant narrates, “under the administration of the dogmatists, her rule 
was despotic.”7 This despotism fostered instability and encouraged factions, under the aegis of 
Leibniz, Plato, Descartes, and others, to advance theories of their own while engaging in conflict 
with their contemporaries and predecessors. Skeptics, taking Hume as their paradigmatic 
representative, are cast as a band of nomads whose misgivings about the Queen constitute a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Ovid.	  Metamorphoses.	  13:508-­‐510.	  Quoted	  by	  Kant,	  CPR,	  A	  ix,	  n.	  d.	  4	  Allen	  Wood.	  “A	  Lawful	  Revolution	  and	  a	  Coming	  of	  Age	  in	  Metaphysics,”	  in	  The	  Classics	  of	  Western	  
Philosophy:	  A	  Reader’s	  Guide,	  edited	  by	  Jorge	  J.	  E.	  Gracia	  et	  al.,	  326-­‐345.	  Malden,	  MA:	  Blackwell	  Publishing,	  2003.	  p.	  327	  5	  Allen	  Wood.	  “A	  Lawful	  Revolution	  and	  a	  Coming	  of	  Age	  in	  Metaphysics,”	  p.	  327	  6	  CPR.	  A	  viii-­‐xiii	  	  7	  CPR.	  A	  ix 
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threat to the entire civil state. Another salvo was hurled at the throne by Locke’s empiricism, 
which “challenged the Queen’s right to rule by alleging that her ancestry can be traced to the 
‘common rabble of experience’.”8 A final critic of the Queen’s administration Kant termed 
indifferentists,9 which “are depicted as a disgruntled faction that has no real allegiance to the 
queen but offers no significant [alternative] to the prevailing despotic regime.”10 
§3. Metaphilosophy of the Critique of Pure Reason 
§3.1 A Metaphilosophical Analysis of Critique in the A Preface: Critique as 
Tribunal11  
§3.1.1. The Trial of Metaphysics in The Court of Justice: Reason’s Search for 
Self-Knowledge 
In an effort to prevent any more skirmishes from erupting in this “battlefield of endless 
controversies,”12 Kant “institute[s] a court of justice,”13 in which the parties defending and 
contesting the regime of Metaphysics will argue their cases. ‘Critique’ is thus construed as a 
tribunal empaneled to pronounce a judgment on the legitimacy of the Queen’s title, and to draft 
for all parties involved a just settlement, to which each litigant will pay strict compliance. “The 
judge in this court is the human faculty of reason,” Wood states, “just as the claims to be decided 
by it, both those of metaphysics and those of its accusers, are made on behalf of reason.”14 Here 
‘critique’ is depicted as intrinsically reflexive in character. Reason’s gaze must be turned inward 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Allen	  Wood.	  “A	  Lawful	  Revolution	  and	  a	  Coming	  of	  Age	  in	  Metaphysics,”	  p.	  327 
9
 CPR. A x-xi  
10
 Allen	  Wood.	  “A	  Lawful	  Revolution	  and	  a	  Coming	  of	  Age	  in	  Metaphysics,”	  p.	  327 
11	  See Anindya Bhattacharyya. “Kant’s Notion of ‘Critique’ in the Critique of Pure Reason,” for the A/B Preface 
Tribunal/Revolution distinction. <http://bat020.com/2010/10/27/kants-notion-of-critique-in-the-critique-of-pure-
reason/>	  
12 CPR. A viii  
13
 CPR. A xii  
14 Allen	  Wood.	  “A	  Lawful	  Revolution	  and	  a	  Coming	  of	  Age	  in	  Metaphysics,”	  p.	  328 
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so as to achieve “the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge.”15 The court 
of justice is entrusted with the task of discerning both the Queen’s legitimate powers and their 
limits, allowing reason to “secure its rightful claims while dismissing all its groundless 
pretensions, and this not by mere decrees” but from reason’s own legislative capacities.16 In 
“Proclamation” Kant elucidates:  
Critical philosophy is that which sets out to conquer, not by attempts to [dogmatically] 
build or [skeptically] overthrow systems, or even (like moderatism [i.e., indifferentism]) 
to put up a roof, but no house, on stilts, for temporary accommodation, but rather by 
investigating the power of human reason … But now there actually is something in 
human reason, which can be known to us by no experience, and yet proves its reality and 
truth in effects that are presentable in experience, and thus can also (by an a priori 
principle, indeed) be absolutely commanded.17 
 
We may not, therefore, dogmatically invoke reason’s capacity as an authority in arbitrating 
metaphysical inquiries. “Reason,” Kant reminds us, “has no dictatorial authority.”18 The Critical 
Philosophy succeeds in satisfying reason – where dogmatism, skepticism, and indifferentism fail 
– by deducing principles which prescribe strict boundaries for knowledge. By setting realizable 
goals that can only be materialized in experience, self-knowledge circumvents reason’s internally 
conflicting maxims, which are given philosophical expression by the dialectics of dogmatism 
and skepticism. “One can regard the critique of pure reason,” Kant claims, 
as the true court of justice for all controversies of pure reason; for the critique is not 
involved in these disputes, which pertain immediately to objects, but rather sets the task 
of determining and judging what is lawful in reason in general in accordance with the 
principles of its primary institution…Without this, reason is as it were in the state of 
nature, and it cannot make its assertions and claims valid or secure them except through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 CPR. A xii  
16 CPR. A xii  
17 Immanuel Kant. “Proclamation of the Imminent Conclusion of a Treaty of Perpetual Peace in Philosophy,” 
Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, edited by Henry Allison and Peter Heath, translated by Gary Hatfield et al., 451-
461. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 455/8.416 
18 CPR. A 738/B 766. Kant’s mistrust in reason is both prudent and understandable. Consider “how little cause we 
have to place trust in our reason” since “in one of the most important parts of our desire for knowledge it [did] not 
merely forsake us but even [enticed] us with delusions and in the end [betrayed] us” (B xv). 
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war. The critique, on the contrary, which derives all decisions from the ground-rules of 
its own constitution, whose authority no one can doubt, grants us the peace of a state of 
law [...].19 20 
Thus it is that the Critical Philosophy may be turned to as not merely another contender in a long 
line of conflicts, but as the alternative that “puts an end to the conflict [of reason] and induces it 
to rest satisfied with a limited but undisputed patrimony.”21 
§3.1.2. The Dangers of Dogmatism in the Age of Critique 
Kant invokes a political metaphor to contextualize the history of metaphysics, but it 
would be a mistake to assume that the metaphor is merely a metaphor. In a footnote appended to 
the A Preface Kant declares, “Our age is the genuine age of criticism, to which everything must 
submit.”22 Neither religion’s sanctity nor the state’s majesty exempts them from the 
interrogations of reason. Those who endeavor to circumvent criticism, either through evasion or 
violence, arouse “just suspicion, and cannot claim the sincere respect which reason accords only 
to that which has been able to sustain the test of free and open examination.”23 Allen Wood 
connects the A Preface’s political metaphor with the evolving structures of state government 
throughout Enlightenment era Europe, stating  
Kant’s metaphor depicts a kind of political event which occupied the imaginations of 
many progressive thinkers during the Enlightenment: the revolutionary transformation of 
a despotism or absolute monarchy into a constitutional system of government, achieved 
in a just and orderly fashion, with both the procedure and the outcome dictated by the 
requirements of natural law.24 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 CPR. A 751/B 779 
20 The metaphilosophical position that philosophical inquiry should function as a purgative with determinate 
therapeutic effects and provide “peace” to its inquirer, is shared by the later Wittgenstein, who states that “The real 
discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to – The one that gives 
philosophy peace, so that it is not tormented by questions which bring itself into question. (Emphasis mine.) 
(Philosophical Investigations, §133) 
21
 CPR. A 768/B 796  
22 CPR. A xii.  
23
 CPR. A xi, n.  
24 Allen	  Wood.	  “A	  Lawful	  Revolution	  and	  a	  Coming	  of	  Age	  in	  Metaphysics,”	  p.	  328 
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These considerations should assist us in understanding why Kant wrote polemics marked by both 
hostility and a distinct lack of patience for those whose philosophical predilections belonged to a 
bygone and thoroughly un-Enlightened age. It is easy to misstate, misunderstand, or simply miss 
altogether what exactly the problem is here. To be sure, Kant offers little autobiographical 
commentary in the Critique, and there are few places amidst those eight hundred pages where 
accounting for his motivations would have done more to clarify his intended purposes than here. 
Such as it is I will hazard a plausible Kantian25 interpretation of the problem. The problem is not 
simply that some individuals deduce entire ontologies comprised of occult entities, e.g., monads, 
which are defined so as to elide cognitive contact as a possible object of experience.26 At worst, 
solicitations for feedback elicit “an incredulous stare,”27 which, confined to the Ivory Tower, is 
neither unusual nor poses any real threat to the world outside academia. The problem, then, is 
that the very epistemic practices that allow dogmatic commitments to beliefs about monads and 
immaterial substances in the world of metaphysics, allow similarly dogmatic commitments to 
beliefs which have positively devastating effects in the world of social and political institutions. 
Samuel Butler captures this intuition when he asserts, “It is in the uncompromisingness with 
which dogma is held and not in the dogma that the danger lies.”28 More problematic, then, than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25
 Robert	  Hanna:	  “It	  is	  commonplace	  to	  distinguish	  between	  Kant’s	  metaphysics	  and	  epistemology,	  i.e.	  the	  metaphysical	  and	  epistemological	  theories	  that	  are	  developed	  in	  Kant’s	  own	  writings,	  and	  Kantian	  metaphysics	  and	  epistemology,	  i.e.	  contemporary	  metaphysical	  and	  epistemological	  theory	  inspired	  by	  Kant’s	  writings	  in	  theoretical	  philosophy,	  which	  is	  not	  slavishly	  restricted	  to	  Kant’s	  own	  doctrines	  and	  is	  rationally	  defensible	  on	  grounds	  independent	  of	  Kant’s	  texts.”	  Excerpted	  from,	  “Review	  of	  Leslie	  Stevenson’s	  
Inspirations	  from	  Kant:	  Essays.”	  Notre	  Dame	  Philosophical	  Reviews:	  An	  Electronic	  Journal,	  posted	  24	  December	  2011.	  	  <http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/27862-­‐inspirations-­‐from-­‐kant-­‐essays/> 
26
 cf. Gottfried W. Leibniz. “The Principles of Philosophy, or, The Monadology.” Philosophical Essays, edited by 
Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, 213-224. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1989. 
27
 David Lewis’ characterization of peoples’ general response to his doctrine of modal realism. David Lewis. On the 
Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. See §2.8 The Incredulous Stare, pp. 133-5 
28
 Samuel Butler. The Way of All Flesh. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004 (1903). p. 222 
	  	   8	  
the matter constituting dogmatically held beliefs is the form those beliefs are arrived at and the 
attitude with which they are held. “The truly dangerous error,” Allen Wood observes, 
is to imagine that human beings have access to some faculty or source of wisdom higher 
than reason, exempt from rational criticism, and to be followed in preference to it. The 
importance of subjecting reason itself to critique lies precisely in the fact that beyond 
reason there can be no legitimate appeal.29 
 
§3.1.3. The Activities of Reason: Normative and Juristic 
 The metaphorical Tribunal of Reason provides fertile grounds for metaphilosophical 
excavation. One interpretation of Kant commonly encountered in the secondary literature reads 
him as maintaining that the activity of reason is foundational in grounding our systems of 
theoretical and practical cognition. To be sure, Kant makes various claims throughout the 
Critique which lend plausibility to this interpretation. Another interpretation suggests that the 
“activity of reason is not foundational, but juridical,” and that reason is tasked not with the 
foundations of our epistemic and moral frameworks, but with their legitimation.30 Recall that 
reason is the faculty for cognizing or choosing according to principles, which are necessary and 
normative, that is, essentially prescriptive, rules of human thought.31 Under this interpretation, 
then, Kant’s institution of the Tribunal of Reason was an effort to adjudicate various parties’ 
claims to normative priority, e.g. Locke’s sensibility and Leibniz’s understanding. A tribunal, 
however, is not imposed, but rather legitimated “as an organ of the Law.”32 Critical reason, then, 
is  
rather a derived, third organ that does not create, but gives an orientation. Yet, the 
deliberation of the Tribunal can occur only because the Tribunal puts forward, by itself a 
law that is not included in the claims of the parties, but on the contrary is issued by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29
 Allen Wood. Kant. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005. p. 109 
30 Maria Chiara Pievatolo. “Kant and the Juridical Nature of Pure Reason” Ratio Juris 12.3 September (1999): 311-
27. p. 311 
31 CPR. A 836/B 864 
32 Maria Chiara Pievatolo. “Kant and the Juridical Nature of Pure Reason” p. 313 
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Tribunal itself.33 
The tribunal Kant inaugurated is disanalagous to the traditional first-order judicial process 
wherein a presiding judge hears testimony concerning the features of ordinary experience, such 
as empirical objects and brute matters of fact. This is because the first-order judicial process 
presupposes the existence of a court comprising various legal procedures and protocols, which 
are accepted without question. Kant’s tribunal, however,  
has to face a state of conflict and anarchy, caused by a crisis of the traditional rules, and 
has to work out the very framework of legitimacy. Declaration of these new structures of 
legitimacy cannot boil down to the assumption of full power or the designation of a new 
prince, but must include the rules through which the claims of litigants can be settled.34 
 
To attain the sort of epistemic constitution under consideration requires a commitment to the 
method of philosophy over and above the content, i.e., objects and properties, we are 
philosophizing about. 
§3.1.4. The Under-Laborer Conception of Philosophy: Concluding the A Preface 
In his “Epistle to the Reader” John Locke describes those responsible for “advancing the 
sciences” in the “commonwealth of learning” as the “master-builders, whose mighty 
designs…will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity.”35 In the humbling 
company of these “ingenious and industrious men…it is ambition enough to be employed as an 
under-laborer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the 
way to knowledge.”36 This can be a controversial and thankless, however necessary, task. Kant 
adopts a similar metaphilosophical position, stating that what he is offering is  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33
 Maria Chiara Pievatolo. “Kant and the Juridical Nature of Pure Reason” pp. 313-4 
34
 Maria Chiara Pievatolo. “Kant and the Juridical Nature of Pure Reason” p. 314 
35 John Locke. “Epistle to the Reader,” An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H Nidditch in the 
Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979. p. 13 
36 John Locke. “Epistle to the Reader,” An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 13 
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not a doctrine, but must be called only a critique of pure reason, and its utility would 
really be only negative, serving not for the amplification but only for the purification of 
our reason, and for keeping it free of errors, by which a great deal is already won.37 
 
The importance of this declaration would be hard to overstate: Kant does not position the 
Critique as a rival to other systems of speculative metaphysics, but rather as logically and 
normatively prior to any system of metaphysics. This passage illustrates Kant’s intention to cast 
the Critique as a second-order or meta-theoretical framework, which does not contend with 
metaphysical claims made in first-order theories about the world, but rather offers second-order 
considerations about the conditions necessary for subjects of our cognitive constitution to gather 
knowledge from experience. It is important not to construe the substance of this claim too 
narrowly. Kant articulates the transcendental conditions necessary for employing synthetic a 
priori judgments not only as the resolution to the problem of grounding experiential knowledge, 
but of grounding all possible knowledge. Unpacking this claim reveals various assumptions at 
work concerning, inter alia, the normative trajectory for philosophy, which, in its present 
iteration, complements Kant’s claims about the Critique as a “propaedeutic.”38 By this Kant 
means he intends for the Critique to liberate science and other knowledge-expanding first-order 
domains of inquiry from the cognitively illegitimate assumptions endemic to speculative 
metaphysics, with its fondness for epistemic overreach. 
§3.2 A Metaphilosophical Analysis of Critique in the B Preface: Critique as 
Revolution 
  §3.2.1. The Negative Project and the Securing of a Scientific Metaphysics 
 In both the A & B Prefaces, Kant advertises the Critical method as a revolutionary event 
in philosophy. Prior to the Critique, speculative inquiry proceeded by a mere “groping about,” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 CPR. A 11/B 25 
38 CPR. A 11/B 25 
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and was still at a distance “from having entered upon the secure course of a science.”39 Kant uses 
logic, mathematics, and physics as philosophical disciplines which can serve to illustrate the 
hallmark signs of achieving scientific status. Beginning with logic, Kant credits the attainment of 
scientific status to the establishment of self-imposed limitations, particularly by treating, as its 
exclusive subject matter, the formal activities of the understanding.40 Mathematics achieved the 
success of a science similarly, by restricting its subjects to just those objects represented by the 
mathematician, ascribing “to the thing nothing except what followed necessarily from what he 
himself had put into it in accordance with its concept.”41 42 Finally, Kant credits the scientific 
status of modern physics to the same character of self-limitation. These scientists, Locke’s 
“master-builders,” “comprehended that reason has insight only into what it itself produces 
according to its own design; that it must take the lead with principles for its judgments according 
to constant laws and compel nature to answer its questions.”43  
The prestige these disciplines have all succeeded to is the result of imposing and strictly 
enforcing limitations in their respective spheres of inquiry. Repurposing the judicial metaphor 
from the original Preface, Kant recapitulates the main ideas in this stunning passage: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39
 CPR. B vii  
40
 CPR. B viii  
41 CPR. B xii 
42
 To be clear, Kant is advocating that metaphysicians progress in their investigations by adopting the path that 
mathematics took to become a science; he is not, however, endorsing the method of mathematics as the instrument 
for those investigations. At various points (cf. B x; The Discipline of Pure Reason) Kant maintains that 
metaphysicians cannot simply employ the various methodologies of mathematics to set them on the secure path to 
science, since “Mathematics gives the most resplendent example of pure reason happily expanding itself without 
assistance from experience” (A 712-3/B 740-1). Mathematics is advanced through the construction of theorems and 
axioms a priori, which is licensed by the nature of the constituent ingredients in those systems, i.e., pure intuitions. 
Metaphysicians, on the other hand, can derive no comparably legitimate a priori axioms from entities and structures 
provided by ontology. (cf. CPR. A 725-7/B 753-5 for Kant’s criticism of Hobbes, who endeavors to construct such 
an a priori theory in his political philosophy; The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry, “Kant’s Philosophy 
of Mathematics”) 
43 CPR, B xiii 
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Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must approach nature with its principles in one 
hand, according to which alone the agreement among appearances can count as laws, and, 
in the other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance with these principles – yet in 
order to be instructed by nature not as a pupil, who has recited to him whatever the 
teacher wants to say, but like an appointed judge who compels witnesses to answer the 
questions he puts to them.44 
 
In “Lawful Revolution” Wood characterizes this phenomenon in terms of intellectual maturation. 
It merits quoting at length: 
The pre-modern attitude toward nature was one of childlike trust and uncritical 
receptiveness; the modern or scientific attitude is one in which the human mind, 
assuming the status of adulthood, liberates itself from the tutelage of nature and adopts 
toward nature the attitude of a suspicious magistrate shrewdly cross-examining a possibly 
recalcitrant and prevaricating witness.45 
 
Here, then, we have one of Kant’s central metaphilosophical convictions: Philosophy in general, 
and metaphysics in particular, “must imitate these sciences not as to their matter, but as to their 
form, as purposeful and principled inquiries into the objects designated” by each science.46 “It 
must no longer claim to know anything a priori,” Wood intones, “except what our own faculties 
contribute to the constitution of these objects.”47 For it is in exercising restraint in their 
respective domains that these sciences have earned their prestige. Or, as Kant articulates in one 
of only a handful of single-line sentences, “It is precisely in knowing its limits that philosophy 
consists.”48 Thus only by means of reason’s self-examination, terminating ultimately in the 
establishment of determinate limits for metaphysical inquiry, can we “simultaneously release 
reason from its contradictions and protect its empirical employment.”49 Here Kant has struck a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 CPR. B xiii 
45 Allen	  Wood.	  “A	  Lawful	  Revolution	  and	  a	  Coming	  of	  Age	  in	  Metaphysics,”	  p.	  329 
46
 Matthew Kelsey. The Mother of Chaos and Night: Kant’s Metaphilosophical Attack on Indifferentism. 
(Unpublished). p. 9 
47 Allen	  Wood.	  “A	  Lawful	  Revolution	  and	  a	  Coming	  of	  Age	  in	  Metaphysics,”	  p.	  329 
48 CPR, A 737/B 765 
49 Sebastian Gardner. Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason, New York: Routledge, 1999. p. 24 
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“cognitive bargain” where “the price to be paid for the security of empirical knowledge is the 
frustration of our desire for transcendent metaphysical knowledge.”50  
§3.2.2. The Negative Project as Precursor to Practical Reason: The Death of 
Dogma is the Birth of Morality51 
Considering the Critical Philosophy as a gift to future generations of philosophers Kant is 
moved to ask, “What sort of treasure is it we intend to leave to posterity?”52 His answer is 
illuminating. He anticipates that there will be those who emphasize the negative project, and as 
such take the Critique “teaching us never to venture with speculate reason beyond the boundaries 
of experience” as its primary aim.53 To be clear, nowhere in this passage does he correct this 
reading as a misconception. Rather, Kant supplements this reading with an understanding of the 
positive project, stating 
Hence a critique that limits the speculative use of reason is, to be sure, to that extent 
negative, but because it simultaneously removes an obstacle that limits or even threatens 
to wipe out the practical use of reason, this critique is also in fact of positive and very 
important utility…54 
 
This passage is revealing. Kant, at least in the B Preface, has given phrasing to the positive 
project which defines its utility in terms of practical (i.e., moral) reason. To be clear, Kant is 
using positive here in a somewhat different sense than I have been. What he is characterizing as 
positive in this passage is not the principle-generating epistemic faculties found in the Critique, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Sebastian Gardner. Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 24-5 
51
 Henry M. Taber’s concise summary of the relationship between Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy. 
Henry M. Taber. Faith or Fact. New York: Peter Eckler Publishing, 1897. p. 86 
52 CPR. B xxv 
53 CPR. B xxv 
54 CPR. B xxv 
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but rather an account of practical reason delineated in later works.55 Call this non-epistemic 
positive project the practical project. In the quoted passage, Kant is conceiving an asymmetrical 
dependence-relationship between the practical and negative projects. The relationship is highly 
complex and Kant does not venture perhaps as far as we would like in clarifying their 
connection. What this and other similar passages indicate is that, while the practical project is 
normatively prior, the negative project is needed as a prerequisite to help clear the domain of 
practical reason from the cognitive contaminants left by speculative metaphysics. In these terms, 
it is perfectly conceivable to have the negative project and not the moral, e.g., placing the 
restrictions on pure speculative reason to clear out the metaphysical cobwebs while adopting 
some non-cognitivist model of moral theory, which makes no positive, categorical demands on 
its adherents. Conversely, it is inconceivable that we could get the moral project without first the 
negative, the latter preventing as it does “reason…[from falling] into contradiction with itself.”56 
Here, then, we see the negative project giving rise to two independent positive projects, one 
epistemic and one moral.57 The former being enunciated in metaphilosophical terms when Kant 
claims that “it is…the first and most important task of philosophy to deprive metaphysics, once 
and for all, of its injurious influence, by attacking its errors at their very source.”58 This reading 
should add a layer of significance to the role of the negative project, as Kant construed it.  
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 cf. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and Critique of Practical Judgment (1788). For both of 
these and more of Kant’s moral philosophy, see Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, translated and edited by 
Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
56 CPR. B xxv 
57
 My thesis, which argues for the priority of the negative project over the positive is circumscribed merely to the 
theoretical, that is, epistemic domain. Kant was much clearer about the order in which these projects stood in his 
practical philosophy. In the Second Critique, for example, Kant endorses a “Primacy of the Practical” view of the 
relationship between theoretical and practical philosophy. For more of this discussion, see Sebastian Gardner. “The 
Primacy of Practical Reason.” A Companion to Kant, edited by Graham Bird, 259-274. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. 
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  §3.2.3. Kant’s Copernican Turn and The Conformity Thesis 
 The most remarkable progression in Kant’s thought in the six years separating the 
publications of the A (1781) and B (1787) editions of the Critique concern his call for a 
Copernican Revolution in metaphysics. Kant proposes, as the essential feature of this revolution, 
an epistemic inversion of the relationship between the subject and the object.  “Up to now,” Kant 
observes, “it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects,” 
but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would 
extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try 
whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the 
object must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested 
possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects 
before they are given to us…. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the 
objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object 
(as an object of the senses) conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I 
can very well represent the possibility to myself.59 
 
This, the so-called Copernican Revolution in philosophy, comprises two distinct theses which we 
will provisionally accept to see whether they can resolve the “problems of metaphysics”: 
i. The ontological structures and properties of phenomenal space-time necessarily conform 
to the subjective and non-empirical cognitive capacities for sensory intuition that are 
present in the innate mental structures with which rational human beings are biologically 
endowed. 
ii. The ontological structures and properties of phenomenal natural objects and events, 
together with the causal-dynamic relations between them, also necessarily conform to the 
subjective and non-empirical cognitive capacities for conceptualization, judgment, 
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understanding, thought, and logical reasoning present in the innate mental structures with 
which rational human beings are biologically endowed.60 61 
I will adopt Robert Hanna’s term, the Conformity Thesis, for the conjunction of these two 
theses.62 This “experiment of reason” is a central pillar of Kant’s metaphilosophy. With his 
enunciation of the Conformity Thesis, we may take Kant to be endorsing a particular normative 
scope for philosophical inquiry which suggests that all meaningful questions in theoretical 
philosophy are questions about the origins, nature, scope, and limitations of human cognition.  
 Kant draws inspiration from Copernicus by adopting the “revolution in thinking 
necessary to embrace [the Conformity Thesis] to the revolution in thinking required to embrace 
Copernicus’ heliocentric theory of celestial motion.”63 Prior to Copernicus, movement was 
posited of the heavenly bodies while observers on earth were at rest. Copernicus’s insight was to 
recognize that to make sense of our observations we too must be regarded as in motion. Kant 
treats Copernicus’ heliocentric model as an analogue to his revolutionary theory of cognition. 
Theories of cognition antedating Kant’s shared a common presupposition, namely, that cognition 
depended on objects; Kant’s insight was to invert that model such that the objects of cognition 
are dependent on mental apparatuses producing the very cognition of those objects. “In both 
cases,” Allen Wood claims, 
we made an assumption that was natural because our attention was focused on the objects 
of our knowledge and not on our own relation to them. Hence everything seemed to 
depend on the objects we observed and not on us. The revolution in both cases consisted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 I am following Robert Hanna in The Limits of Sense and Reason: An Analytical Commentary on Kant’s Critique 
of Pure Reason (Unpublished) in identifying these two theses as the central features to the Copernican Revolution in 
philosophy. 
61
 cf. CPR. A 111; B 166-7 
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 Robert Hanna. The Limits of Sense and Reason: An Analytical and Critical Commentary on Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason. Unpublished. p. 7 
63 Allen Wood. Kant, p. 29 
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in taking account, contrary to the way things naturally seem, of our own role in the 
processes we are trying to observe and understand.64 
 
Philosophy, then, will need to adopt a new, transcendental method which proceeds by 
discovering and justifying the conditions imposed by cognizers which render experience both 
possible and intelligible. 
 §3.3. Transcendental Idealism:65 Metaphysics as Epistemology 
 TI constitutes a Copernicus-inspired, and therefore “inherently anthropocentric,” 
epistemological doctrine, which proposes an “essentially mitigated form of rationalist 
metaphysics.”66 This doctrine is a complex conjunction of two distinct theses, namely, 
transcendentalism and idealism. Considered separately, and beginning with the former, 
transcendentalism states that “all representational contents, and thereby the contents of all 
cognitions, are strictly determined in their underlying structure by certain universal, innate, a 
priori human mental capacities that make experience itself possible.”67 Kant designates 
transcendental all cognition “that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode 
of cognition of objects in so far as this [mode of cognition] is to be possible a priori.”68 69 The 
latter conjunct, idealism, claims that “all the proper objects of human cognition are nothing but 
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 Henceforth, TI 
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 Robert Hanna. The Limits of Sense and Reason: An Analytical and Critical Commentary on Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason. p. 5 
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 Robert Hanna. Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. pp. 19-
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 In a footnote to the Prolegomena’s Appendix, Kant clarifies: High towers and the metaphysically-great men who 
resemble them, around both of which there is usually much wind, are not for me. My place is the fertile bathos of 
experience, and the word: transcendental…does not signify something that surpasses all experience, but something 
that indeed precedes experience (a priori), but that, all the same, is destined to nothing more than solely to make 
cognitions from experience possible. (Kant, Prolegomena, p. 161) 
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objects of sensory experience,” which come in the form of appearances or phenomena.70 These 
in turn refer to the “intersubjectively communicable contents of sensory or experiential 
representation.”71 Defined in these terms, the objects of cognition are emphatically not those 
objects transcending the fundamental conditions through which possible objects are actualized in 
human experience. These transcendent entities Kant designates things-in-themselves or 
noumena.72 Thus the conjunction of these two theses yields Transcendental Idealism, by which 
Kant means 
the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations 
only, not things in themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms 
of our intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of 
objects viewed as things in themselves.73 
 
To clarify, transcendental idealism advances the thesis that the very forms and normative 
principles which function to structure our representations, in accordance with our universal and 
innate system of cognitive capacities, also serve to structure the objects of our cognition. In other 
words, whatever supplies form and structure to one supplies it to the other.74 It is this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70
 Robert Hanna. Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, p. 20 
71
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 In Kant’s Reflexionen 4473 (Ak. 17:564) Kant states: “The question is, how can we represent to ourselves things 
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This passage echoes questions Kant put to his former student, Marcus Herz, in a famous letter dated 21 February 
1772 (Ak. 10:130): “I noticed that I still lacked	  something	  essential,	  something	  that	  in	  my	  long	  metaphysical	  
studies	  I,	  as	  well	  as	  others,	  had	  failed	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  and	  that,	  in	  fact	  constitutes	  the	  key	  to	  the	  whole	  secret	  
of	  hitherto	  still	  obscure	  metaphysics.	  I	  asked	  myself:	  What	  is	  the	  ground	  of	  the	  reference	  of	  that	  in	  us	  which	  we	  
call	  ‘representation’	  to	  the	  object?”	  [Kant,	  Correspondence,	  p.	  132-­‐3]	  For	  the	  philosophical	  significance	  of	  this	  letter	  as	  “marking	  the	  ‘Critical	  turn’	  in	  Kant’s	  thought,”	  see	  Jennifer	  Mensch.	  “The	  Key	  to	  All	  Metaphysics:	  Kant’s	  Letter	  to	  Herz,	  1772.”	  Kantian	  Review	  12.02	  (2007):	  109-­‐127.	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fundamental insight underwriting Kant’s declaration that “The proud name of ontology must 
give way to the more modest title of a Transcendental Analytic.”75 
§4. Antagonists of the Critique of Pure Reason – Against the Dogmatist: Kant’s 
Critique in the Amphiboly 
§4.1. Dogmatic Empiricism? Kant’s Criticism of Locke 
On the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection76 is appended to the Transcendental 
Analytic, and intended to clarify the anti-dogmatic lessons of the Analytic. There, Kant criticizes 
Locke for endeavoring to obtain extra-sensory knowledge using the “pure cognitions of reason”: 
Locke, “after he had derived all concepts and principles from experience, goes so far in their use 
as to assert that one can prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul (though both 
objects lie entirely outside of the bounds of possible experience) just as self-evidently as any 
mathematical theorem.”77 In §13 of the Deduction Locke is further chastened for his willingness 
to advance doctrines, e.g., concerning the existence and properties of God, which earn him 
rebuke as a dogmatist, opening “the gates wide to enthusiasm, since reason, once it has authority 
on its side, will not be kept within limits by indeterminate recommendations of moderation.”78 
Locke is attempting to draw conclusions about the epistemically opaque nature of supersensible 
reality from a posteriori facts concerning our various psychological faculties and dispositions; in 
short, Locke’s conclusions are writing checks that his premises can’t cash. In supplying the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Kant’s	  pre-­‐occupation	  with	  this	  question	  and	  its	  derivatives	  ranged	  throughout	  the	  decade	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  first	  edition	  of	  the	  Critique.	  Broadly	  construed,	  these	  concerns,	  i.e.,	  how	  it	  is	  that	  innate,	  universal	  and	  a	  priori	  concepts	  accurately	  and	  necessarily	  represent	  their	  objects	  in	  cognition,	  are	  answered	  by	  the	  doctrine	  of	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content of metaphysical concepts from sources other than pure reason, Locke, according to Kant, 
has been misled by his enthusiasm. Whatever his preferences for empirical sources of 
knowledge, this move earns him prime placement along Leibniz, as dogmatists par excellence. 
§4.1.2. Two Sides of the Same Coin: Leibniz and Locke, Dogmatist 
Extraordinaires 
 In the Amphiboly, Kant endeavors to establish a connection between classical empiricism 
and rationalism, characterizing both traditions as prone to the temptations of dogmatism – and 
both awaiting a similar fate. Kant takes as his dramatis personae: Locke, the Dogmatic 
Empiricist, and Leibniz, the Dogmatic Rationalist. Kant identifies an “amphiboly” – that is, “a 
confusion of the pure object of the understanding with the appearance”79 – in the arguments of 
both philosophers. Committing an amphiboly arises when one confuses either the appearance 
with the object of the understanding, and thereby regards their empirical nature as contingent, or 
the genuine object of the understanding with an object given under empirical conditions. Kant 
charges Leibniz with the former error, Locke the latter: “Leibniz intellectualized the 
appearances, just as Locke totally sensitivized the concepts of the understanding.”80 The 
commission of these errors epitomizes what Kant means by dogmatism, which, by failing to take 
account of the cognitive constitution of the knowing subject, is unable to satisfy the normative 
demands of critical philosophy. 
 §4.2. An Infatuation with Understanding: Kant’s Criticism of Leibniz 
 Notwithstanding their various points of contact, Kant’s criticisms in the Amphiboly take 
Leibniz more often than Locke as their target. As such, my objective here is to clarify Kant’s 
motivations for charging Leibniz with fallaciously endeavoring “to cognize the inner constitution 	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of things by comparing all objects only with the understanding, and the abstract formal concepts 
of its thinking.”81 One of Leibniz’s central doctrines is the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which, 
stated negatively, proposes that nothing exists without a sufficient reason for its existence, and 
thus, no effect is without a cause. This principle, according to Leibniz, “must be considered one 
of the greatest and most fruitful of all human knowledge, for upon it is built a great part of 
metaphysics, physical science, and moral science.”82 It is only by applying the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason83 universally that we may locate the set of complete and determinate concepts 
of things. After extolling the epistemic virtues of the PSR, Leibniz offers an account of the 
epistemic role of phenomena: 
If Bodies are phenomena and judged in accordance with how they appear to us, they will 
not be real since they will appear differently to different people. And so the reality of 
bodies, of space, of motion, and of time seems to consist in the fact that they are 
phenomena of God, that is, the object of his knowledge by intuition [scientia visionis]. 
And the distinction between the appearance bodies have with respect to us and with 
respect to God, is, in a certain way, like that between a drawing in perspective and a 
ground plan. For there are different drawings in perspective, depending upon the position 
of the viewer, while a ground plan or geometrical [viz., logical-analytical] representation 
is unique. Indeed, God sees things exactly as they are in accordance with geometrical 
truth, although he also knows how everything appears to everything else, and so he 
eminently contains in himself all other appearances.84 
 
Leibniz accounts for the objectivity of phenomena by construing them as intuitions of God, 
whose “vision” is unmediated by subjective features of cognition. Absent this divine perspective, 
the ontological status of phenomena would be reduced to mere appearances, and lack any 
normative dimension or grounds for objectively valid judgments. Leibniz’s notion of phenomena 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 CPR. A 270/B 326 
82
 Gottfried W. Leibniz. “On the General Characteristic.” Philosophical Papers and Letters, 2nd ed., edited and 
translated by, L. E. Loemker, 221-228. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989. p. 227 
83
 Henceforth, PSR 
84 Gottfried W. Leibniz. “From the Letters to Des Bosses.” Philosophical Essays, edited by Roger Ariew and 
Daniel Garber, 197-205. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1989. p. 199 
	  	   22	  
stands in diametric opposition to Kant’s, for whom even space and time itself are pure forms of 
sensual intuition.85 Insofar as the Critical method sinks the norms and principles governing 
cognition in anthropocentric foundations, Leibniz would reject Kant’s view, preferring rather 
that metaphysical inquiries be conducted under the aegis of this divine, epistemically privileged 
perspective. 
 Throughout Leibniz’s metaphysics, the faculty of understanding enjoys cognitive and 
normative primacy. It is this error that Kant most scrupulously attends to in the Amphiboly. In 
his effort to deduce the conceptual consequences of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Leibniz 
considers only the “rational conceptual connection” as the “ground” or sufficient reason for some 
objects existence.86 Noting this proclivity, Kant then criticizes Leibniz for treating “sensible 
causes” as functionally impotent in his metaphysics. This metaphilosophical commitment to the 
primacy of the understanding renders sensibility superfluous, and leaves Leibniz with an 
impoverished and distorted picture of our cognitive constitution, and by extension, our lived 
experience. 
§5. Critique of Pure Reason: A Metaphysics of Experience 
§5.1. The Transcendental Aesthetic:87 The Faculty of Sensibility 
§5.1.1. Sensibility, Intuitions, and the Forms of Cognition 
 In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant endeavors to discover the a priori conditions for the 
possibility of sensibility, the faculty through which objects are given to us.88 Elsewhere Kant 
addresses the a posteriori content of sensibility, but strictly delimits the scope here to all and 	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only those conditions which can be known a priori by the cognizing subject. Sensibility, which 
contributes the spatio-temporal form of the objects of experience, is an enabling-condition 
providing a medium through which appearances are perceived.89 The matter of appearances is 
provided a posteriori through sensation by the object; the spatiotemporal form of these 
appearances is given a priori and contributed by the subject. Intuitions, however, which are 
produced by sensibility, are the immediate, “conscious, objective representations” that allow us 
to apprehend something as being some thing.90 In other words, “objects appear to subjects [in 
space and time] via intuition.”91 With the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant is endeavoring to 
establish space and time as the pure, i.e., a priori, forms of sensible intuition. This interpretation 
of space-time both follows from Kant’s Conformity Thesis and has tremendous explanatory 
value in addressing some key issues common to metaphysical inquiries, such as 1) the 
fundamental nature of space and time, 2) their presence permeating our cognitive experience, 
and 3) reconciling both the a priori and synthetic “character of the mathematical propositions 
which give us cognition of the physical properties of quantities and shapes in given space and 
time.”92 93 
 §5.1.2. The Subjective Nature of the Forms of Intuition 
This proposal, Kant’s opening gambit of his transcendental philosophy, suggests that the 
fundamental nature of space and time lies in their roles as forms of intuition. That is, together 
they comprise the necessary means through which subjects with our mental disposition “make 
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cognitive contact with things.”94 Moreover, Kant asserts that neither space-time nor the 
spatiotemporal features of objects and events have any mind-independent existence, that is, 
existence apart from the role as subjective forms conditioning our empirical experience. “This 
proposal,” Allen Wood clarifies, “can be seen as arising from the insight that…” 
the awareness of temporality (of being located now, at this determinate moment of time) 
is fundamental to the perspectivity of every experience that is possible for us, and that 
being positioned and oriented in space is equally fundamental to the ineluctable 
perspectivity of our experience of anything we take to be other than ourselves and our 
subjective experiences.95 
 
The epistemic roles assigned to space and time are ones which describe “how we relate to objects 
when we intuit them” as “we come into immediate cognitive contact with them on the basis of 
our unique cognitive perspective.”96 Space and time, then, are not fundamentally objective 
features constituting mind-independent reality, but are defined subjectively in terms of their 
functionality in providing a perceptual field through which cognizers have experience. In his 
Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, Kant clarifies: 
Space is not something objective and real, nor a substance, nor an accident, nor a relation; 
instead, it is subjective and ideal, and originates from the mind's nature in accord with a 
stable law as a scheme, as it were, for coordinating everything sensed externally.97 98 
 
§5.1.3. Transcendental Idealism, Empirical Realism, and the Nature of 
Appearances 
Kant introduces his notion of ‘appearances’ as a technical concept in the Aesthetic, and 
defines them as the “undetermined object of an empirical intuition.”99 Simplified, Kant is 	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treating appearances as the “objects of experience qua sensed.”100 Following logically from the 
theory of space and time advanced in the Aesthetic is Kant’s doctrine of appearances. Kant 
concludes that if space and time are to be denied any existence independent of our cognizing 
intuitions, then appearances within space and time are, too, without mind-independent existence. 
Applying this theory further requires recognizing even objects as appearances, cognized no 
longer as things in themselves but rather represented as they must be for cognizers like us 
according “to the subjective constitution of our mind, without which predicates could not be 
ascribed to things at all.”101 In other words, all we can know a priori is how we must understand 
reality, not how reality is in itself. Kant is careful to stipulate, however, that the ideality of space 
and time and the objects located within them is strictly transcendental. In other words, they are 
ideal only insofar as they are constituent members in a theory describing the possibility of 
experience. Thus, space, time, and their objects are all empirically real.102 Their reality consists, 
however, not as members in the cognitively impenetrable class of objects described as things-in-
themselves, about which we are to endeavor to gain knowledge “independently of the conditions 
under which we cognize them,” a la the pre-Kant understanding of objects in reality.103 The 
reality of these objects “consists rather in the way they conform to an order of nature that…is 
transcendentally necessary if experience is to be possible at all.”104
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§5.2. The Transcendental Analytic105: The Faculty of Understanding 
§5.2.1 Groundwork for the Analytic: Concepts, Intuitions, and Judgments 
Kant takes concepts to be “essentially general mental representations of objects, or 
cognitive devices of description.”106 Concepts function by “ordering different representations 
under a common one”;107 or, in other words, by standing for or picking out all those universal 
objects and properties in the world of experience, and subsuming all and only those discrete 
objects that fall under those universal objects and properties. Since concepts serve as cognitive 
mediators they are only indirectly referential. Kant distinguishes empirical from pure concepts. 
Empirical concepts108 are essentially a complex comprising intensional content, i.e., a set of 
discrete properties, which allows for the identification and subsumption of an object under its 
concept.109 A pure concept is a non-empirical second-order concept whose function is to classify 
and organize empirical concepts.110 Conversely, intuitions are “essentially non-conceptual 
mental representations of individual objects, or cognitive devices of direct singular reference.”111 
Intuitions, then, function by standing for or picking out singular objects in the world. For Kant, 
concepts and intuitions represent the materials necessary for the production of cognition. 
Without the cooperation of both, cognition, and therefore knowledge, is impossible:  
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Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, 
just as necessary to make the mind’s concepts sensible—that is, to add an object to them 
in intuition—as to make our intuitions understandable—that is, to bring them under 
concepts. These two powers, or capacities, cannot exchange their functions. The 
understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only from their 
unification can cognition arise. 112  
 
Concepts and intuitions are non-derivative and therefore irreducible, interdependent and 
therefore complementary, and fundamentally basic to Kant’s epistemology. Hence their 
relationship, and that of the faculties of sensibility and understanding more generally, is of 
paramount importance to the doctrines advanced in the Critique.113 114 A judgment, according to 
Kant, is a “logically-structured unity of concepts” paired with either intuitions or other 
concepts.115 Judgments function via predication, where a concept is applied or ascribed to either 
an object of sensible intuition, or another concept. 
§5.2.2. From the Aesthetic to the Analytic 
 Whereas the Transcendental Aesthetic provides Kant’s enumeration of the a priori 
principles of sensibility, in the Transcendental Analytic Kant undertakes the enumeration of the a 
priori principles of the understanding. Kant’s primary objective in the Aesthetic was to argue 
that sensibility is endowed with two a priori forms, i.e., space and time, the application of which 
is necessary to all sensible intuitions. Logic begins with a similar undertaking, that is, Kant 	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introduces a parallel relationship between concepts and judgments. Specifically, he endeavors to 
establish the existence of pure concepts of the understanding, a.k.a., categories, which apply 
necessarily to all and only the possible objects of experience, that is, any object whose 
representation is manifest in intuitions, concepts, or judgments. Discovering the existence of 
these categories, however, will require a deduction. 
§5.3 The Metaphysical Deduction: The Pure Concepts of the Understanding 
 §5.3.1. Pure General Logic116 as the Leitfaden to the Categories 
In the B Preface, Kant defines logic as “the science that exhaustively presents and strictly proves 
nothing but the formal rules of all thinking.”117 He goes on to suggest logic is concerned with 
“the science and the rules of the understanding.”118 PGL, according to Kant, is the species of 
logic which delineates the principles governing the relationships between ideas in our thinking; it 
provides the “minimal structure of claim-making.”119 In this capacity it is non-empirical, 
normative, and universal, and deals principally with the formal features of the understanding and 
reason.120 It is also, crucially, “insensitive to ontological furniture,” and is thus constitutionally 
incapable of producing objective claims about objects or events in the world.121 In his dismissal 
of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre as a “totally indefensible system,” Kant cites Fichte’s violation of 
just this epistemic norm, claiming 
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The principles of logic cannot lead to any material knowledge, since logic, that is to say, 
pure logic, abstracts from the content of knowledge; the attempt to cull a real object out 
of logic is a vain effort and therefore something that no one has ever achieved.122 
 
Although PGL does not reveal facts from the external world, it does reveal the complete formal 
structure of the understanding. It is this fact that allows Kant to use logic as a springboard to the 
categories. “The conceptual discriminations made in PGL come from the understanding, so the 
understanding must discriminate objects according to analogous rules.”123 In the Metaphysical 
Deduction, Kant demonstrates that the Table of Categories stands in a 1:1 correspondence with 
the Table of Judgments. Thus by enumerating the “formal rules of all thought,” cleanly lifted 
from Aristotelian logic, we have a complete inventory of the types of judgments we can make.124 
Kant appropriates the architecture of the Table of Judgments in structuring the Table of 
Categories. Their symmetry is neither arbitrary nor artificial. Designating the forms of judgment 
and the categories as the two kinds of formal conditions, Kant claims that the latter are “indeed 
nothing but precisely these functions of judging insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is 
determined in regard to them.”125 Experience is first made possible, and then rendered coherent 
by the categories, which structure our intuitions into an organized unity.  
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§6. The Transcendental Deduction:126 Absorbing Heaven into Earth 
  §6.1. Setting the Stage 
§6.1.1 Transcendental Confusion: The History of an “Enigma” 
 In Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity Robert Paul Wolff laments the “remarkable fact” that 
“after two centuries of intensive criticism and study, commentators have not come to an 
agreement about the precise nature of Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Analytic,” and 
claims in addition that “Clearly, the Analytic, and thereby the entire Critical Philosophy, must 
remain an enigma until these answers are answered.”127 Despite the fact that this passage was 
written in the middle of the last century, contemporary accounts of Kant’s project in the Analytic 
are marked by a profusion of theories concerning “what Kant was trying to prove, what he 
assumed as premises, and what the steps were by which he connected the two.”128 For all the 
subtle differences between these theories, commentators generally take Kant to be advancing one 
of two possible fundamental aims: 1) The Positive Project, which sees the Analytic as a rejoinder 
to the skeptic,129 consists in the establishment of Kant’s epistemology, centered on his 
transcendental theory of cognition; or 2) The Negative Project, which sees the Analytic as a 
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rejoinder to the dogmatic metaphysician,130 consists in establishing the limitations of knowledge 
to all and just those possible objects of experience.131 I will argue that the results of the 
Transcendental Deduction,132 the nervus probandi of the Analytic, and by extension the Critique 
as a whole, are largely negative, and that the positive results obtain only as a result of the 
negative. In other words, the Negative (or “boundary-setting”) Project is lexically, logically, and 
normatively prior to the Positive (or “principal-generating”) Project.133 
§6.1.2. Kant’s (Humean) Motivations Behind the Transcendental Deduction 
 In §58 of the Prolegomena, Kant amends “Hume’s Principle, not to drive the use of 
reason dogmatically beyond the field of all possible experience,” to include a proviso which 
cautions us from “[looking] upon the field of possible experience as something that bounds itself 
in the eyes of our reason.”134 In §59, however, Kant offers his principle, introduced as “the result 
of the entire Critique,” which states that “reason, through all its a priori principles, never teaches 
us about anything more than objects of possible experience alone, and of these, nothing more 
than what can be cognized in experience.”135 Hume’s Principle, as appropriated and frequently 
used by Kant, proves invaluable in his effort to undermine “the foundations of abstruse 	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philosophy, which seems to have hitherto served only as a shelter to superstition, and a cover to 
obscurity and error.”136 It is, in other words, essential to the progress of his negative campaign to 
restrict the domain of metaphysical inquiry to that of possible experience. But more than that, it 
is inherently positive insofar as it liberates us from a morality manufactured from “religious fears 
and prejudices.”137 Thus, “the negative theoretical strictures,” Manfred Kuehn states, “are meant 
to contribute to a more positive moral outlook.”138 Kant seems to anticipate this reading when he 
observes, 
On a cursory overview of this work, one might believe that one perceives it to be only of 
negative utility, teaching us never to venture with speculative reason beyond the 
boundaries of experience; and in fact that is its first usefulness…Hence a critique that 
limits the speculative use of reason is, to be sure, to that extent negative.139 
 
Treating this passage as representative of Kant’s metaphilosophical intentions, it is clear that 
Kant’s repudiation of speculative metaphysics is not animated by malice, but rather the desire to 
clear a path to an epistemically and metaphysically respectable and responsible morality and 
theology. Thus Kant’s intimation in the B Preface that he “had to deny knowledge in order to 
make room for faith.”140 Here Kant is emphasizing sentiments later echoed in the Method141 and 
the Prolegomena,142 in which the restraint exercised over speculative reason is necessary for 
precluding it from denying God, Freedom, and Immortality. Thus “these notions [are] not to be 
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cognized by pure theoretical reason, but [are] to be thought by pure practical reason.”143 In the 
“Transition to the Transcendental Deduction” Kant introduces the TD by reiterating the need to 
set strict limitations on claims to knowledge, stating, “We are now about to make an attempt to 
see whether we cannot successfully steer human reason between these two cliffs, assign its 
determinate boundaries, and still keep open the entire field of its purposive activity.”144 
§6.2. The Transcendental Deduction: Groundwork and Key Components 
§6.2.1. On the Need for a Judgment of Metaphysical Cognition: Introducing the 
Synthetic A Priori Judgment 
 For Kant, analytic propositions are informative only insofar as they account for the use of 
our concepts, i.e., they function by making more transparent to cognizers what is being thought 
in a given concept.145 These propositions are unqualified to serve as principles guiding the 
investigations of metaphysics or the natural sciences, as they are incapable of amplifying or 
systematizing empirical knowledge. Thus the a priori principles used in metaphysical or 
scientific inquiries cannot be analytic, since such principles are not the product of discrete 
choices concerning which concepts to use.146 For example, “A principle such as ‘Every change 
has a cause’,” Allen Wood clarifies, “is synthetic,” since it 
[connects] the concept of the subject to a predicate lying outside the subject concept, so 
that the judgment extends or amplifies our cognition of the objects falling under the 
subject concept. The concept of a change is merely the concept of a state of the world 
succeeded by a different state, and the concept of a cause is that of a state of the world 
upon which a different state follows with necessity, according to a causal law. But it is no 
part of our concept of a change that the succession of states involved in it is determined 
necessarily or in accordance with a law. Therefore, if it is to be a part of our conception 
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of the natural world that all changes in it have causes, then our knowledge that this is the 
case must consist in a priori knowledge of a synthetic proposition.147 
 
In other words, for a judgment to be synthetic148 and a priori, there must be some ‘X’ 
synthesizing the subject with the predicate, and we cannot derive this ‘X’ from experience since 
the judgment is a priori.149 Kant designates this dilemma the “general problem of pure reason,” 
and states that the “real problem of pure reason” can be addressed in a single question: “How are 
synthetic a priori judgments possible?”150 Unpacked, this question is asking how a judgment can 
simultaneously be necessarily true, refer to the empirical world of experience, and cognizable 
independently of all sensory experience. Answering this question would reveal at once the new 
foundation for metaphysical cognition. More to the point, should this answer yield normative 
principles concerning the scope and boundaries of such cognition, then “a decision on the 
possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in general and the determination of its sources as well 
as its extent and boundaries” could be ascertained, and the problem addressed in the Critique, 
solved.151At various points in the Critique Kant describes a certain a priori cognition 
unconstrained by the conditions of sensibility and whose extension is the class of “purely 
intelligible” objects, which are located “beyond all bounds of experience.”152 In criticizing 
speculative metaphysicians, Kant often takes this type of cognition as his target.153 	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  §6.2.2. Quid Iuris & Quid Facti154: The Aims of the Transcendental Deduction 
 Kant begins the TD by revisiting his Philosopher as Prosecutor character and marking the 
two distinct considerations a defendant would encounter at a judicial inquest. 
Jurists, when the speak of entitlements and claims, distinguish in a legal matter between 
the questions about what is lawful (quid juris) and that which concerns the fact (quid 
facti), and since they demand proof of both, they call the first, that which is to establish 
the entitlement or the legal claim, the deduction.155 
 
In its philosophical application, this judicial procedure is meant to adjudicate the legitimacy of a 
claim of title or “right to use.”156 To be clear, the TD is not intended to merely explain the 
possession of the categories, which is not in dispute, but rather offer a transcendental justification 
of their necessary and a priori relation to the objects of experience.157 A transcendental 
deduction, then, is a “demonstration of the objective validity, i.e., the empirical meaningfulness 
and cognitive significance, of an a priori representation R, by means of demonstrating that R is 
the presupposition of some other representation R*, which is assumed for the purposes of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 It	  is	  impossible	  for	  me	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  [merely	  logical,	  or	  even	  a	  putatively	  ontological]	  object	  a	  
priori	  without	  a	  special	  clue	  which	  is	  to	  be	  found	  outside	  of	  this	  concept.	  [...]	  In	  transcendental	  cognition,	  as	  long	  as	  it	  has	  to	  do	  merely	  with	  concepts	  of	  the	  understanding,	  this	  guideline	  is	  possible	  experience.	  The	  proof	  does	  not	  show,	  that	  is,	  that	  the	  given	  concept	  (e.g.,	  of	  that	  which	  happens)	  leads	  directly	  to	  another	  concept	  (that	  of	  a	  cause),	  for	  such	  a	  transition	  would	  be	  a	  leap	  for	  which	  nothing	  could	  be	  held	  responsible;	  rather	  it	  shows	  that	  experience	  itself,	  hence	  the	  object	  of	  experience,	  would	  be	  impossible	  without	  such	  a	  connection.	  The	  proof,	  therefore,	  had	  to	  indicate	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  possibility	  of	  achieving	  synthetically	  and	  a	  priori	  a	  certain	  cognition	  of	  things	  which	  is	  not	  contained	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  them.	  Without	  attention	  to	  this	  the	  proofs,	  like	  water	  breaking	  its	  banks,	  run	  wildly	  across	  the	  country,	  wherever	  the	  tendency	  of	  hidden	  association	  may	  happen	  to	  lead	  them.	  (CPR.	  A	  782-­‐3/B	  810-­‐1;	  cf.	  A	  736-­‐7/B	  764-­‐5)	  	  The	  classical	  rationalists’	  singular	  commitment	  to	  analytic	  judgments	  and	  the	  empiricists’	  parallel	  commitment	  to	  synthetic	  judgments	  has	  left	  us	  with	  a	  distorted	  account	  of	  ordinary	  experience,	  “and	  for	  that	  reason	  cannot	  clearly	  and	  securely	  relate	  the	  metaphysical	  to	  the	  empirical.”	  [Matthew	  Kelsey.	  The	  Mother	  of	  
Chaos	  and	  Night:	  Kant’s	  Metaphilosophical	  Attack	  on	  Indifferentism,	  p.	  276] 
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argument to be objectively valid.”158 Moreover, a transcendental deduction will make strict 
appeal to only the conditions of cognition, which, Kant claims, are known a priori with apodictic 
certainty, since, with respect to the pure concepts, reason need contend only with itself.159 With 
respect to the Primacy of the Negative Thesis, I will endeavor in my treatment of the TD to 
establish that the principal aim here is to invalidate any titles claiming the ‘right to use’ the 
categories to cognize objects beyond the field of possible experience; while the subsidiary aim 
will be to legitimate the use of the categories in their a priori relation to the possible objects of 
experience.160 
§6.3. The Main Event: The Argument Structure of the Transcendental Deduction161 
Phase I: §§15-21 
§15. Synthesis162 
 Kant’s initiates the first phase of the TD with the assertion that experience emerges as the 
product of concepts and intuitions, the latter of which require combining by the apperceptive 
subject through the act of synthesis. “Synthesis,” Kant clarifies, is “putting different 
representations together with each other and grasping their manifoldness in one cognition.”163 
This act is performed by assimilating various elements of information into a single cognition, 
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organizing these elements according to strictly prescribed rules which call for representational 
content to have structural unity. To unify a manifold of intuitions into a single experienced object 
requires representing the elements of that object “by some constraint that cannot come from the 
object, [but must rather] come from the subject.”164 This is because the act of synthesis, i.e., the 
combining and ordering of intuitions and concepts, issues from the understanding. In pre-Kantian 
epistemology it was a presupposition shared by both skeptics and dogmatists alike that “the 
object constrains us from without.” In other words, for reason or the senses to be corrected 
requires accessing the object absent the constraints of cognition. For Kant, it simply makes no 
sense whatever to talk about, much less desire knowledge of, things as they are independent of 
the conditions under which their cognized. 
§§16-17. Apperception 
 Kant then argues that “the unification of the manifold (over time) is possible only if 
particular representations are brought under a single consciousness, since without this there 
would be no way for the various representations to be related.”165 Failing to order intuitions from 
a manifold into a complex of representations, which is then ascribed to a single consciousness, 
would result in a series of discrete and disconnected perceptions rather than objectively valid 
representations suitable for judgment. 
The ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something 
would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say 
that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for 
me.166 
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For these representations to maintain cognitive significance for me, there must, in other words, 
be a numerically identical, apperceptive subject who considers these perceptions as experienced 
and the matter supplied in making judgments. At various points Kant refers to “this spontaneous 
executive power of self-consciousness”167 as pure apperception, original apperception, or the 
transcendental unity of self-consciousness, which “stands behind experience as its supreme 
condition.”168 
 Kant is careful here to distinguish empirical apperception, which is the self-
consciousness we detect in the ordinary affairs of reflective experience from transcendental 
apperception, which is concerned not with particular representations but with the conditions 
necessary to subsume those representations under a single consciousness. Were there only the 
former, experience would manifest as a concatenation of discrete representations, apprehended 
by different subjects which “would be dispersed over time, different I’s corresponding to 
different representations it receives.”169 Absent transcendental apperception, in other words, 
there would be nothing to “connect the different introspective moments; there would be no ‘I’ 
who is having an experience, but rather a bunch of perceptions – This… This… Then this… I 
sense green… I sense blue – without any coherent subject.”170 Kant stipulates that “[It is] only 
because I can comprehend their manifold in a consciousness [that] I [can] call them all together 
my representations; for otherwise I would have as multicolored, diverse a self as I have 
representations of which I am conscious.”171 
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Kant argues for the necessity of the categories on the grounds that the apperceptive 
subject must be capable of distinguishing the objects it consciously represents from 
consciousness itself. There must be a way of partitioning the way in which something seems to 
me subjectively from what is actually the case objectively.172 It is only when we represent our 
intuitions synthetically that an object is capable of constraining those intuitions. This synthetic 
representation demands activity and contributions from the cognizing subject. Although sensible 
intuitions play a critical role in our representations of objects, mere receptivity is incapable of 
producing synthetic unity. This is because Kant understands objectivity as fundamentally 
normative, which requires that “claims for unity [be] held together with a certain kind of 
warrant.”173 
[Representations] belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of the 
apperception in the synthesis of intuitions, i.e., in accordance with principles of the 
objective determination of all representations insofar as cognition can come from them, 
which principles are all derived from the principle of the transcendental unity of 
apperception. Only in this way does there arise from this relation a judgment, i.e., a 
relation that is objectively valid, and this is sufficiently distinguished from the relation of 
the same representations in which there would be only subjective validity, e.g., in 
accordance with the laws of association. In accordance with the latter I could only say, 
“If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight,” but not, “It, the body, is heavy,” which 
would be to say that these two representations are combined in the object, i.e., regardless 
of any difference in the condition of the subject, and are not merely found together in 
perception.174 
 
Stripped of Kantian jargon, determining the objective relations held between subjects and objects 
requires that sensible intuitions, within which these objects are located, are synthesized 
according to objectively valid principles prescribed for judgment. And since these principles 
have a transcendental function, i.e., operating as conditions for the possibility of experience, they 
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cannot be derived from experience; they are, in other words, a priori. What, then, are these 
principles which partition consciousness from its objects? They are the pure concepts of the 
understanding, i.e., the categories. The faculty of understanding is at once the faculty for 
judgment and logic. It is logic we must take as giving us the “clue” for how to conceptualize 
experience.  It is the categories that “allow us to recognize what we are given through the senses 
as objects rather than merely subjective states.”175 “All sensible intuitions stand under 
categories,” Kant asserts, “as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in 
one consciousness.”176 Altman summarizes where we are at this point with this conditional: 
Concepts are conditions for the possibility of distinguishing self-consciousness from 
objective representations, and because a unitary consciousness is necessary for 
experience to be possible, and a unitary consciousness is possible only given its 
distinction from objective representations, conceptual discrimination by the 
understanding is necessary for experience.177 
 
Judging by means of the categories is required for discriminating the subjective ‘laws of 
association’ from objectively held relations, which is a necessary capacity for the apperceptive 
subject, which is itself a pre-condition for experience. This concludes Phase I of the TD. Thus far 
the argument has established a deduction for just those beings whose mental constitution requires 
the joint efforts of concepts and intuitions to produce cognition and therefore knowledge. 
Phase II: §§22-27 
Already having legitimated the application of the categories to the limited class of actual 
or possible experience, in this phase, Kant now purports to show that they are required as well 
for empirical intuitions of objects in space and time.178 He substantiates this claim by 
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maintaining that the cognition of objects is only possible – and thus the categories are only 
applicable – given sensible intuitions yielded in space and time. Phase II completes the B 
Deduction as well as the stated principal and subsidiary aims from §6.2.2. That is, Kant has 
demonstrated that, broadly, the categories are both limited to, and explain, any actual and 
possible experience for creatures of our cognitive constitution.179 
 §6.4. The Primacy of the Negative in the Transcendental Deduction 
 This straightforward reading of the TD should lend the Primacy of the Negative Thesis 
overwhelming plausibility. Characterizing the epistemic import of the TD in a single statement 
may yield something like the following: 
The transcendental deduction licenses creatures of our finite mental constitution to use 
the pure concepts of the understanding, i.e., categories, to make normatively binding, 
cognitively significant, and epistemically legitimate claims to knowledge of actual or 
possible objects of experience… and nothing more. 
I submit that commentators who remain steadfast in their conviction that the TD treats the 
positive project as primary have perhaps fixated on the italicized portion of the statement 
summarizing the TD’s central argument. I contend, moreover, that this reading is only made 
prima facie plausible by either grossly trivializing or else ignoring altogether the emboldened 
phrase which follows it. Recall from §3.1 that according to Kant’s theory of cognition, reason is 
dependent on the understanding for its relation to objects.180 Reason’s efforts at cognition are 
normatively restricted to the domain of possible experience, which is to say, “Reason does not 
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provide a new route of cognitive access to objects.”181 Looking ahead to the Transcendental 
Dialectic, then, we see that the negative project in the TD functions as a barricade, preventing the 
conditions of sensibility from being extended so as posit immaterial beings for metaphysical 
consideration.182 “There can be no a priori knowledge,” Kant reminds us, “except of objects of 
possible experience.”183 I submit that the notion of possible experience functions as a normative 
constraint through which Kant ultimately succeeds in establishing the conclusions of his negative 
project.184 
 In discussing Kant’s theory of experience, Wilfrid Sellars claims, “unless one is clear 
about what it is to judge, one is doomed to remain in the labyrinth of traditional metaphysics. On 
the other hand, to be clear about what it is to judge is to have Ariadne’s thread in one’s hand.”185 
I submit that the same holds for understanding the primacy of Kant’s negative project. 
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